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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 twenty-
five years ago. Through Title VII Congress sought to remove artificial
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982 & Supp. VI 1986)).
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barriers that limited employment opportunities for minorities. The
statute is not limited, however, to prohibiting race discrimination. Title
VII directly confronts the problem of discrimination in the workplace
by prohibiting employment decisions based on the race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin of the employee or applicant.2 The Act prohibits
an employer from favoring one group of employees over another due to
irrelevant characteristics and classifications.
Title VII litigation occupies a significant portion of the federal
docket. 3 The lack of clarity in the terms of the statute and the legisla-
tive history has forced courts to define the parameters of Title VII with
little direction from Congress. For example, courts first had to define
the elements that constitute a violation of Title VII.4 Section 703(a)(1)
clearly contemplates intentional discrimination, or disparate treatment,
as a basis for liability.' The language of section 703(a)(2), however, does
not contain any explicit requirement of intent.' Thus, whether plaintiffs
had to prove intentional discrimination to state a claim under Title VII
remained unclear. The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.7
resolved the controversy by finding that a plaintiff states a claim under
section 703(a)(2) by showing that a facially neutral employment prac-
tice disproportionately disqualifies a protected class from employment.
Therefore, discriminatory consequences as well as motivation might in-
validate an employment practice.8
2. The relevant provision of Title VII is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982), which reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of an individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id.
3. Individual plaintiffs filed 7661 employment discrimination suits in the twelve-month pe-
riod ending March 31, 1986. C. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMNT DISCIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
AcTiONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS A-1 (rev. ed. 1988).
4. See Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement
and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225 (1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). The pertinent provision states: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual. . . ." Id.
6. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). The pertinent provision states: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants ...... Id.
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. Note, however, that the Supreme Court recently has restricted the ability of petitioners to
state a Title VII claim by pleading discriminatory consequences. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
Inc., 57 U.S.L.W. 4654 (U.S. June 12, 1989). The Court decided that discriminatory impact is not
enough to make a seniority system unlawful; the plaintiff must show discriminatory intent. Id.
1442 [Vol. 42:1441
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Although the question of liability is important," this Note focuses
primarily on the recovery stage of Title VII proceedings and the proper
exercise of discretion to be used by courts when fashioning relief. In the
cases and problems discussed below, the reader should assume that the
plaintiff has established liability.
After finding a violation of the Act, courts are authorized to pre-
scribe relief to alleviate the effects of unlawful discrimination. 10 Deter-
mining proper relief is a controversial issue in many Title VII cases.
Although the language of the relief provision of Title VII seems to give
courts wide discretion in fashioning a remedy for victims of unlawful
discrimination, the Supreme Court has articulated standards for trial
courts to follow when exercising that discretion." A successful Title VII
plaintiff is presumptively entitled to equitable relief, and a court may
deny relief only for reasons that would not frustrate the objectives of
Title VII."2
One form of equitable relief available to victorious Title VII plain-
tiffs is reinstatement to the position that they would have held absent
the unlawful employment practice. 13 Presumptive entitlement to rein-
statement for victims of wrongful discharge, or instatement to appli-
cants wrongfully denied employment, poses unique problems not found
in other forms of equitable relief. Antagonism between employer and
employee is one obvious difficulty. Because some degree of antagonism
is a natural consequence of any litigation, courts usually will not deny
reinstatement merely because of hostility created by the discrimination
suit.14 The existence of extraordinary animosity with little or no hope of
an amicable working relationship, however, will result in a denial of
9. For a discussion of liability issues, see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An
Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REV. 531 (1981); Belton, Bur-
dens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34
VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CM. L. REV. 235 (1971).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). The statute states:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging
in an unlawful employment practice ... the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging
in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropri-
ate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without backpay, .... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
Id.
11. See infra Part IIIA.
12. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Though this Note refers to reinstatement of employ-
ees, the discussion is equally applicable to instatement of applicants wrongfully denied
employment.
14. See, e.g., Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 969 (1981).
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reinstatement."5
A more difficult question arises when an order of immediate rein-
statement results in the displacement of an incumbent employee.
Should the presence of an incumbent employee limit a court's power to
award immediate reinstatement to a victim of employment discrimina-
tion? An analysis of this significant issue involves a balancing of Title
VII objectives and the rights of innocent third parties.
Limiting the power of courts to give relief to a victim of discrimina-
tion by displacing an incumbent employee can frustrate severely the
make whole policy of Title VII. An employer can avoid reinstating an
employee that it previously discriminated against by filling the position
prior to the conclusion of litigation. On the other hand, allowing courts
to order immediate reinstatement without considering the presence of
an incumbent employee can trample the rights of innocent third
parties."6
This Note will examine the propriety of ordering immediate rein-
statement to a victim of discrimination under Title VII when that relief
requires the displacement of an innocent incumbent employee. Part II
presents a general discussion of Title VII. Part III examines principles
articulated by the Supreme Court that govern the fashioning of Title
VII remedies. Part IV analyzes three approaches taken by courts when
asked to "bump" an incumbent employee in order to reinstate the pre-
vailing Title VII plaintiff. Part V considers reinstatement practice and
rules under the National Labor Relations Act for guidance in determin-
ing what effect the presence of an incumbent employee should have on
courts that fashion Title VII relief. Finally, Part VI attempts to clarify
the views presented in the preceding sections and to develop guiding
principles for courts that consider this issue.
II. TITLE VII OF THE CivIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers, 17 la-
bor organizations, 8 and employment agencies 9 from discriminating in
employment decisions because of the race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin of the employee. Originally, the Act afforded a remedy for
employment discrimination only to employees in the private sector. The
15. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Jones Truck Lines, 767 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Kallir,
Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 920 (1977).
16. See infra Part IIIB.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). For the text of this provision, see supra note 2.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1982).
19. Id. § 2000e-2(b).
1444 [Vol. 42:1441
1989] TITLE VII REMEDIES 1445
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197220 amended Title VII, ex-
panding its coverage to include employees of state and local govern-
ments as well as federal government employees in the executive branch
and administrative agencies. Congress intended that Title VII serve as
a tool to fight against discriminatory employment practices.21
The history of Title VII begins with the adoption of the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments following the Civil War. These
amendments attempted to eliminate discrimination against black citi-
zens.22 Soon afterward, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 187023
and the Civil Rights Act of 1871.24 Unfortunately, these statutes largely
were unused for over one hundred years. Because Congress enacted the
statutes pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, courts read a state ac-
tion requirement into the statutes, which greatly limited their applica-
bility. The level of education and economic position of blacks also
prevented enforcement of their rights under the statutes.2"
Modern attempts to provide equality in employment opportunities
began with Executive Order 8802,26 issued by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt in 1941. Roosevelt's order established the Fair Employment
Practices Committee (FEPC) and prohibited discrimination in the de-
fense industry and government.27 A number of states accordingly re-
20. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17).
21. See 118 CONG. REc. 7166 (1972) (statement of Sen. Harrison Williams) (stating that
"[t]oday's action will represent a vital step toward the realization of equal employment opportuni-
ties"); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (noting that the lan-
guage of Title VII makes plain Congress's purpose: to assure equality of employment opportunities
and eliminate discriminatory practices that have fostered racially stratified job environments to
the disadvantage of minority citizens).
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (abolishing slavery); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (due process
and equal protection of the law); id. amend XV, § 1 (right to vote).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (providing a cause of action for racial discrimination in the mak-
ing or enforcement of contracts).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (providing in part a cause of action for the protections afforded
by the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment).
25. Kothe, Implications of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as Amended from the
Employer's Point of View, 1973 LAB. L. DEv. 101, 103.
26. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1941); see J. JONES, W. MURPHY & R. BELTON, DIs-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 2-3 (5th ed. 1987).
27. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1941). The order provided:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the
statutes, and as a prerequisite to the successful conduct of our national defense production
effort, I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there shall be no discrimina-
tion in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed,
color, or national origin, and I do hereby declare that it is the duty of employers and of labor
organizations, in furtherance of said policy and of this order, to provide for the full and equi-
table participation of all workers in defense industries, without discrimination because of
race, creed, color, or national origin. ...
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sponded with legislation aimed toward regulating employment
practices.28 Comprehensive federal legislation, however, did not follow
immediately. Bills attempting to establish federal regulation of employ-
ment practices were defeated in every session of Congress after World
War 11.29 Not until the 1960s did the government begin to respond to
increased pressure from civil rights activists. President John F. Ken-
nedy issued Executive Order 10,9253° in 1961, establishing the Presi-
dent's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. Kennedy's
Executive Order provided the impetus for congressional activity that
culminated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Though the
Executive Order was directed specifically at equal opportunity in gov-
ernment employment, 1 the Kennedy administration clearly wanted
equal opportunity for all persons in all employment opportunities.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains twelve titles that confront
the problem of discrimination in voting, places of accommodation, pub-
lic facilities, federally secured programs, and employment.2 With the
Act, Congress intended to avert a national crisis, end the legacy of slav-
ery and racial oppression, and invoke the power of the courts to resolve
conflicts between races." Title VII of the omnibus Act addresses the
problem of discrimination in employment by rendering unlawful con-
duct that tends to deny minorities equal employment opportunity.
Congress sought to eliminate existing practices that operated to
28. For a discussion of the effectiveness of these state agencies, see Hill, Twenty Years of
State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14
BUFFALO L. REV. 22 (1964).
29. For an examination of early efforts to pass a federal fair employment practices law, see L.
RUCHAMES, RACE, JOBS, & POLrrics, THE STORY OF THE FEPC 22-72 (1953).
30. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961).
31. See id. at 448. The Order provided:
WHEREAS discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin is contrary to the
Constitutional principles and policies of the United States; and
WHEREAS it is the plain and positive obligation of the United States Government to pro-
mote and ensure equal opportunity for all qualified persons... seeking employment with the
Federal Government and on government contracts ....
• . . a single government agency should be charged with responsibility for accomplishing these
objectives.
Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1982); 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000d-6 to 2000h-5 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
33. See Chambers & Goldstein, Title VII: The Continuing Challenge of Establishing Fair
Employment Practices, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 9, 12 (Autumn 1986). The true predecessor of
Title VII was H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), introduced by Representative James
Roosevelt. Extensive debate, compromise, and revision followed before President Lyndon Johnson
signed the final version of Title VII on July 2, 1964. 110 CONG. REC. 17,783 (1964). For a discussion
of the debates, see Special Project, Back Pay in Employment Discrimination Cases, 35 VAND. L.
REv. 892, 902 (1982).
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favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.
Effective relief to victims of unlawful employment practices is an essen-
tial ingredient of this remedial goal. Part III discusses the courts' au-
thority to fashion relief for victims of employment discrimination.
III. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING TITLE VII REMEDIES
Title VII authorizes a court that finds unlawful discrimination to
award equitable relief, including reinstatement, to the prevailing plain-
tiff. 4 The statute allows a court to order any appropriate affirmative
action including reinstatement.3 5 The language of the statute clearly re-
spects the trial court's discretion in decisions whether to award rein-
statement or any other equitable remedy. While recognizing the broad
authority of the district courts, the Supreme Court nevertheless has
enunciated principles to guide courts in the exercise of this discretion.
A. Supreme Court Interpretations
The seminal case that articulates the basic principles governing the
award of Title VII remedies is Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 6 Moody
involved challenges to a paper company's seniority system and program
of employment testing. The Court addressed the issue of whether the
district court acted within its discretion in denying backpay to the pre-
vailing plaintiffs3 7 and held that discretion does not mean inclination,
but instead, "'judgment . . . guided by sound legal principles.' "38
These "sound legal principles" are the larger objectives of the Act. 9
Specifically, the Court noted that Congress enacted Title VII to
further two goals. Foremost, Congress sought to achieve equality of em-
ployment opportunities and remove barriers that provided an advan-
tage to an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.40
Title VII remedies, therefore, exist to deter employers from discrimi-
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Note also that the Eighth Circuit held that the same con-
siderations apply in a case involving a plaintiff applying for an entry level position. See Dickerson
v. Deluxe Check Printers, 703 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1983) (involving an action brought under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). For the complete text of the provision, see supra note 10.
36. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). For an excellent discussion of the standards promulgated by the
Court, see Belton, Harnessing Discretionary Justice in the Employment Discrimination Cases:
The Moody and Franks Standards, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 571 (1983).
37. Moody, 422 U.S. at 411-12. The court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of
backpay holding that backpay could only be denied in "special circumstances." Id. at 414. The
defendants brought this case to the Supreme Court claiming that the court of appeals was in error
when it reversed the district court. Id.
38. Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692d)).
39. Id. at 417.
40. See id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
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nating in the workplace and to eliminate unlawful employment
practices.
In addition to the deterrence objective, the Court also found that
making victims of unlawful discrimination whole for their injuries was
an important goal of Title VII.41 The legislative history of Title VII
provided support for this objective.42 The Moody Court found that
Congress intended to give district courts discretionary power in award-
ing remedies, but only so that the courts could fashion the most com-
plete relief possible.43 The Court concluded that the district court must
consider the statutory objectives of Title VII as it exercises its discre-
tion in awarding backpay. Generally, backpay should be denied only for
reasons that would not frustrate the central statutory goals of eliminat-
ing discrimination and making whole those who have suffered injuries
from past discrimination.44
Although Moody involved the right of prevailing Title VII plaintiffs
to receive backpay, courts have used a similar analysis to determine
when a lower court may order or deny other forms of equitable relief,
such as retroactive seniority45 and reinstatement.46 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit applied the principles of Moody in Nord v. United States Steel
Corp.,47 a case involving reinstatement. The appellate court addressed
whether the district court erred in denying the prevailing plaintiff's re-
quest for reinstatement. The Eleventh Circuit recognized the wide dis-
cretion that Title VII gives district courts in fashioning remedies for
victims of discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit further instructed
courts exercising this discretion to attempt to make persons whole for
injuries suffered from unlawful discrimination.48 Prevailing plaintiffs
41. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418.
42. See 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (analysis by Sen. Harrison Williams). Senator Williams
stated:
The provisions of this section are intended to give the courts wide discretion in exercising
their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible. In dealing with the pres-
ent section 706(g), the courts have stressed that the scope of relief under that section of the
Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the attain-
ment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful employ-
ment practice complained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences
and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position
where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
Id.
43. Moody, 422 U.S. at 421.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 770-71 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986); Nord v. United
States Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1985); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, 703 F.2d
276 (8th Cir. 1983).
47. 758 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1985).
48. Id. at 1473; see also Garza v. Brownsville Indep. School Dist., 700 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir.
1448 [Vol. 42:1441
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are presumptively entitled to equitable relief including reinstatement.
Reinstatement should be denied only for reasons that will not frustrate
the statutory purposes of Title VII.49
What set of circumstances then will justify a court's denial of im-
mediate reinstatement to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff? The Moody
standard provides that equitable relief should be denied only when it
will not frustrate the twin statutory purposes of ending illegal discrimi-
nation in the workplace and rectifying the harm caused to the individ-
ual victim. 50 Moody seems to require courts to find that the statutory
purposes of Title VII would not be frustrated by denying reinstatement
to a victim of discrimination because of the presence of an incumbent
employee. Whether denying reinstatement because of the presence of
an incumbent employee actually fosters or frustrates Title VII objec-
tives will be addressed in Part VI.
B. Protecting the Innocent Victim
Although Moody creates a presumption in favor of immediate rein-
statement, a court is not without power to determine that reinstate-
ment is inappropriate in a particular case. Supreme Court precedent
requires that courts consider the rights of innocent third parties when
fashioning remedies under Title VII.51 Courts should balance the rights
of the victim of discrimination with those of the incumbent employee
when an order of reinstatement would require bumping the incumbent
employee.52 When the court determines that the interest of the victim
of discrimination and the importance of furthering the goals of Title
VII outweigh the incumbent employee's interest in the position, rein-
statement is an appropriate remedy.
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart53 acknowledges Title VII's concern
for the effects of relief decrees on innocent employees. In Manhart the
Court held that requiring female employees to make larger contribu-
tions to a pension fund than male employees was discrimination based
on sex that violated section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.5 4 Although the Court
recognized that Moody creates a presumption in favor of retroactive re-
lief, it concluded that the facts of Manhart did not warrant such re-
1983) (stating that reinstatement or hiring preferences should be denied only in extraordinary
circumstances).
49. Nord, 758 F.2d at 1473.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 36-44.
51. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239 (1982); see also City of Los Angeles
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 371-76 (1977).
52. See Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 239.
53. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
54. Id. at 711.
14491989]
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lief.55 Because Title VII relief is equitable, not legal, determining
whether relief in a particular case is appropriate requires the court to
consider the equitable aspects of the remedial decree. In Manhart al-
lowing the successful plaintiffs to recover the excess contributions from
the pension fund would have been only a minor deterrent to future vio-
lations.5 6 An award of retroactive liability, however, would have deci-
mated the pension fund. Innocent third parties, not the employer,
would suffer the direct effect of a retroactive award.5"
Manhart provides a compelling argument for refusing to reinstate a
victim of discrimination if reinstatement would require the displace-
ment of an incumbent employee. Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc 5 8
demonstrates the Seventh Circuit's exercise of discretion in a case in-
volving reinstatement of unlawfully discharged employees. In
Romasanta plaintiff flight attendants lost positions of employment with
United Air Lines due to the company's no-marriage rule."9 The court
found that the no-marriage rule violated Title VII and considered
whether reinstatement of the 1400 flight attendants affected by the rule
was appropriate. The court refused to order reinstatement because this
remedy would have an adverse impact on incumbent employees.60 Man-
hart and Romasanta indicate that Moody does not prevent courts from
exercising some discretion in consideration of the incumbent employee
when fashioning relief for victims of discrimination.
IV. TITLE VII AND INCUMBENT EMPLOYEE DISPLACEMENT
The following discussion of recent Title VII cases and EEOC policy
will demonstrate how courts treat the presence of incumbent employees
when ordering relief for victims of discrimination. Courts often examine
the Moody standards as a starting point, but equity and discretion still
play large roles in the decisions. Though the decisions tend to be fact
specific, some consistent principles surface. The cases fall into three
broad categories: (1) courts displacing the incumbent employee to af-
ford relief to the victim of discrimination;6 ' (2) courts denying immedi-
55. Id. at 723.
56. Id. qt 720-21.
57. Id. at 722-23.
58. 717 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1983).
59. Id. at 1142. The airline discharged female employees who married, but continued to em-
ploy males who did likewise. Id.
60. Id. at 1151.
61. See, e.g., Walter v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the
district court had equitable power to bump employee to vindicate rights of applicant under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Brewer v. Muscle Shoals Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1515 (l1th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a court may bump incumbent employees in order to redress breach of Title VII
settlement agreement); Spagnuola v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
1450 [Vol. 42:1441
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ate reinstatement due to the presence of an incumbent employee;62 and
(3) courts ordering a hiring preference and front pay when the presence
of an incumbent employee makes immediate reinstatement inappropri-
ate." Representative cases described in sections B, C, and D demon-
strate the reasoning behind each of these views."
A. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Remedies Policy
On February 5, 1985, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) adopted a "Policy Statement on Remedies and Relief
for Individual Cases of Unlawful Discrimination." '65 The EEOC thereby
concluded that relief for victims of employment discrimination should
include nondiscriminatory placement in the positions that they would
have held absent the unlawful discrimination.6 6 While this policy state-
ment might not appear to condone relief beyond that already author-
ized by statute, the statement is revolutionary in one aspect: the EEOC
recognized that nondiscriminatory placement in certain situations
might result in the displacement of an incumbent employee, but stated
court could order bumping of incumbent employee); Sebastian v. Texas Dept. of Corrections, 541
F. Supp. 970 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (stating in dicta that the incumbent must be displaced, if necessary,
to reinstate plaintiff).
62. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981);
Harper v. General Grocers Co., 590 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that reinstatement is inappro-
priate if it requires displacing an incumbent employee).
63. See, e.g., Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985); Thompson v.
Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
64. A fourth category represents those situations in which a defendant employer is able to
place the prevailing plaintiff in the position she would have occupied but for the unlawful discrimi-
nation without displacing the incumbent employee. See Sebastian v. Texas Dept. of Corrections,
541 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. Tex. 1982). This type of relief is especially appropriate when the position is
interchangeable with others or the employer is able to function with employees in duplicative
roles. The court in Sebastian clearly directs that displacement of the incumbent employee is
proper if a choice must be made between the incumbent employee and the prevailing plaintiff. Id.
at 978.
65. 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 401:2615 (Feb. 5, 1985) [hereinafter Remedies Policy]. The Rem-
edies Policy states:
The Commission believes that a full remedy must be sought in each case where a District
Director concludes the case has merit. . . .The remedy must also be tailored, where possi-
ble, to cure the specific situation which gave rise to the violation of the statute involved.
Accordingly, all remedies and relief sought in court, agreed upon in conciliation, or or-
dered in Federal sector decisions should contain the following elements in appropriate
circumstances:
(3) A requirement that each identified victim of discrimination be unconditionally offered
placement in the position the person would have occupied but for the discrimination suffered
by that person.
Id.
66. Id.
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that incumbent employee displacement should not inhibit its directors
from seeking this form of relief.67
Commentators argue forcefully that the presence of an incumbent
employee should not prevent a court from ordering immediate rein-
statement to victims of discrimination. 8 These scholars note that vic-
tims of discrimination possess a presumptive entitlement to
reinstatement and argue that the Remedies Policy does nothing more
than affirm the general principles of Title VII relief promulgated by the
Supreme Court.6 9 Because displacing an incumbent employee does not
frustrate the central statutory purposes of Title VII, the statute man-
dates nondiscriminatory placement of prevailing plaintiffs. 0
Although the Remedies Policy indicates that bumping an incum-
bent employee might be appropriate in some cases, it does not require
EEOC directors to seek reinstatement in every case. 1 Without defining
the circumstances in which reinstatement is appropriate, the EEOC
recognizes that in some cases and in some jurisdictions, reinstatement
will not be available when it will displace an incumbent employee.
The EEOC thus qualifies its strong statement and seems to accept the
status quo reflected in case law.
Statements of policy by an administrative agency such as the
EEOC have minimal precedential value.7 3 A policy statement simply in-
dicates the manner in which an agency intends to exercise a discretion-
ary function such as prosecution for discrimination. Courts continue to
deny immediate reinstatement to victims of employment discrimination
when reinstatement requires displacement of an incumbent employee.
67. Id. at 401: 2617. The Remedies Policy states: "Each identified victim of discrimination is
entitled to an immediate and unconditional offer of placement in the respondent's workforce, to
the position the discriminatee would have occupied absent discrimination, . . . even if the place-
ment of the discriminatee results in the displacement of another of respondent's employees." Id.
68. See, e.g., Alvarez & Lipsky, Remedies for Individual Cases of Unlawful Employment
Discrimination: A Law Enforcement Perspective, 1987 LAB. LAW. 199.
69. Id. at 206.
70. Id. at 212-13.
71. See supra note 65. The Remedies Policy says only that requests for relief should include
reinstatement "in appropriate circumstances." Remedies Policy, supra note 65, at 401:2615.
72. Remedies Policy, supra note 65, at 401: 2617. The Remedies Policy states: "If displace-
ment of an incumbent employee in order to accomplish Nondiscriminatory Placement on behalf of
a discriminatee is clearly inappropriate in a particular setting or is unavailable as a remedy in a
particular jurisdiction, then the respondent must make whole the discriminatee until a Nondis-
criminatory Placement can be accomplished." Id.
73. See Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stat-
ing that "[t]he agency cannot apply or rely upon a general statement of policy as law because a
general statement of policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy"); cf. Skid-
more v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that "the rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their author-
ity, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance").
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A look at representative cases denying and awarding reinstatement
when incumbent employees are present will help define the parameters
of the remedy.
B. Incumbent Displacement: Walters v. City of Atlanta
In Walters v. City of Atlanta the Eleventh Circuit bumped an
incumbent employee for the benefit of the prevailing plaintiff. Atlanta
had established a register of applicants to fill the position of director of
Atlanta's Cyclorama. 5 Applicants listed on the register were rated as
"qualified," "well qualified," or "highly qualified." According to City
procedure, the Commissioner of Parks, Recreation, and Cultural Affairs
selected the Director based on the register and panel interviews con-
ducted by the City.76
Dennis Walters, a white male, first applied for the Directorship in
1981." He received a rating of "well qualified." The interview panel
recommended Walters and two other applicants to the Commissioner.
The Commissioner hired a black woman, Carole Pinckney, as Cyclo-
rama director. 78 Ms. Pinckney's name was not on the register or on the
list of applicants recommended by the interviewers. 79 Because of
problems with Ms. Pinckney's job performance, the City again sought
applicants in 1982. Walters again applied and received a rating of "well
qualified." Nevertheless, the Commissioner awarded the position to a
black male, David Palmer, who admittedly was less qualified than Wal-
ters.80 The City fired Palmer for inadequate job performance on June
29, 1982. Walters reapplied and interviewed a third time for the
position.
Before his third interview, Walters filed timely charges of discrimi-
nation on the basis of race with the EEOC, protesting the Commission's
74. 803 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 1140. The Cyclorama is a dioramic painting commemorating the Battle of Atlanta,
on display in Atlanta's Grant Park. Id. at 1139. The Director supervises the exhibit and conducts
tours. Id.
76. Id. at 1140.
77. Id. Apparently, Walters "formed a desire" to work at the Cyclorama at the age of six
when he first visited the site. He then pursued a course of education aimed at preparing himself
for the position. Id. at 1139, 1150 n.15.
78. Id. at 1141.
79. Id. The Commissioner was concerned that there were no minority candidates for the po-
sition. She also argued that knowledge of history, art, and museum expertise should be secondary
to business management and financial skills. Id.
80. Id. at 1141. Palmer was rated initially as unqualified but appealed that determination
and received a rating of qualified. Palmer was not only less qualified than Waiters but also had a
poor employment record. One week before his interview, the Georgia Department of Labor fired
Palmer for misconduct. In 1981 the City Water Service terminated him due to poor performance.
Id.
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selection of Pinckney and then Palmer for the Directorship. 1 Atlanta's
new Commissioner of Parks filled the vacant Directorship with Carole
Mumford, a white female, while Walters's case was pending in the dis-
trict court.8 2 Walters amended his complaint to allege that the hiring of
Mumford was in retaliation for his filing charges with the EEOC.8
The district court found for Walters on all counts and ordered eq-
uitable relief under Title VII, including backpay and instatement to the
position of Cyclorama director.84 The City appealed, claiming that the
district court abused its discretion in ordering Walters's instatement
because of the consequential displacement of Mumford, the employee
holding the Directorship. 5
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's order instating Wal-
ters and cited four factors to support the displacement of Mumford 6
First, the City repeatedly had discriminated against Walters. Second,
instatement was necessary to deter the City from retaliating against
employees or prospective employees who file charges with the EEOC.
Third, the position sought was unique, and Walters could be made
whole only by receiving the Directorship. Finally, Mumford was guaran-
teed a lateral move within the City if she were bumped. 7 The presence
of these four factors justified the "extraordinary remedy" of instate-
ment. The court warned that its decision should be construed narrowly.
The court expressly did not decide whether bumping is a legitimate
means of redressing unlawful discrimination in cases in which the
bumped employee is not the beneficiary and the instated employee is
not the victim of repeated and related discriminatory acts.8
In addition to these four factors, the Walters opinion also empha-
sized that the incumbent employee was on notice that Walters had a
substantial claim to the Directorship. 9 Mumford was aware that Wal-
ters was seeking instatement into the position. 90 She obviously accepted
81. Walters filed his initial charge with the EEOC on May 20, 1982, protesting the hiring of
Pinckney. He received a right to sue letter on April 23, 1983. He filed a second charge on July 18,
1983, in response to the hiring of Palmer. He received a second right to sue letter in April of 1984.
The district court consolidated these two claims. Id. at 1142.
82. Id. Ms. Mumford was rated as qualified in the same register that listed Walters as well
qualified.
83. Id.
84. Walters v. City of Atlanta, 610 F. Supp. 715, 717-18 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 803 F.2d 1135
(11th Cir. 1986). Walters also received punitive damages and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Walters v. City of Atlanta, 610 F. Supp. 733, 734 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
85. Walters, 803 F.2d at 1148.
86. Id. at 1150.
87. Id. at 1149.
88. Id. at 1149 & n.13.
89. Id. at 1149 & n.12.
90. Id. at 1150 & n.15. One district court has indicated that the plaintiff may get an injunc-
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the position only after receiving assurances from the City that she
would receive another position if Walters were instated.91 Thus,
Mumford's rights as an innocent incumbent were not trampled by the
court's decision. The court also implied that Mumford had legal re-
course against the City for the loss of the Directorship, notwithstanding
her transfer to another position. 2 Although the Eleventh Circuit seems
to endorse the view that bumping should be allowed to achieve the
make whole purposes of Title VII, the decision is limited by its unique
facts.
C. No Displacement: Wangsness v. Watertown School District
The district court in Wangsness v. Watertown School District" de-
nied reinstatement to the prevailing plaintiff because reinstatement
would have displaced an incumbent employee. The court found that the
defendant school district failed to make a good faith effort to accommo-
date Wangsness's religious needs in violation of Title VII.9 4 Wangsness
requested a short leave of absence without pay so that he could attend
a religious festival. The school district denied his request. When Wang-
sness nevertheless attended the festival, the school district discharged
him. Wangsness sought reinstatement and backpay9 5
The district court recognized that reinstatement should be denied
only for reasons that, when applied generally, would not frustrate the
central statutory purposes of Title VII.9 Applying general principles of
equity, the court also balanced competing interests of Wangsness and
the incumbent teacher.9 7 To award Wangsness reinstatement would re-
quire the displacement of a fully tenured teacher. Immediate reinstate-
ment for Wangsness would create an inequitable result due to the
legitimate expectations of the incumbent teacher.9 Wangsness may be
read to propose that to deny reinstatement to a victim of discrimination
when reinstatement would unduly affect the rights of an innocent in-
cumbent employee would not frustrate the statutory objectives of Title
tion requiring the defendant to give written notification of the pending lawsuit to any person con-
sidered for the position. See Holland v. Dole, 591 F. Supp. 983 (M.D. Tenn. 1984). The plaintiff
thus prevents the incumbent employee from being an "innocent victim" that the courts are reluc-
tant to remove.
91. See Walters, 803 F.2d at 1150 n.15.
92. Id.
93. 541 F. Supp. 332 (D.S.D. 1982).
94. Id. at 339.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Albemarle v. Moody Paper Co., 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)).
97. Id. (citing Harper v. General Grocers Co., 590 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 1979)).
98. Id.
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D. Front Pay: Shore v. Federal Express Corp.
In Shore v. Federal Express Corp.100 the Sixth Circuit agreed with
the Wangsness court that reinstatement is an inappropriate remedy
when reinstatement would require the displacement of an incumbent
employee.1 1 Shore lost her job at Federal Express because of sexual
discrimination by her supervisor.10 2 The court acknowledged that victo-
rious Title VII plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to reinstatement,
but nevertheless accepted the parties' contention that reinstatement
was inappropriate in this case because of the presence of an incumbent
employee.'0 3
Front pay, however, emerged as a new remedy in the Sixth Circuit
for victims of discrimination under Title VII because of Shore. The
court followed the growing number of circuits accepting front pay as an
appropriate alternative to immediate reinstatement. 0 4 Front pay also is
appropriate to compensate waiting plaintiffs who have been awarded a
preference for hiring.
A complete discussion of the propriety of awarding front pay is be-
yond the scope of this Note, 0 5 but the rationale for the remedy is
straightforward. Absent extraordinary circumstances, a prevailing
plaintiff is entitled to immediate reinstatement. If reinstatement is in-
appropriate, back pay generally will not make the victim of discrimina-
tion whole. Front pay, though not a complete substitute for immediate
reinstatement, fills the recovery gap that is created when reinstatement
99. The seminal case denying relief when reinstatement would require bumping an incum-
bent employee is Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976). Patterson dealt
with seniority and the promotion rights of blacks and women who prevailed in race and sex dis-
crimination suits. Id. at 262. The Fourth Circuit refused to order promotions and company-wide
seniority that would require bumping white males. Id. at 269-70. The court found that Congress
did not intend Title VII "to be used as a vehicle for displacing incumbents." Id. at 269.
100. 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985).
101. Id. at 1159. The presence of hostility also influenced the court's decision to deny rein-
statement. Id.
102. See Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 589 F. Supp. 662, 667 (W.D. Tenn. 1984) (describ-
ing the situation as a "classic case of disparate treatment based on sex"), aff'd in part, remanded
in part, 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985).
103. Shore, 777 F.2d at 1159 (citing Nord v. United States Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462, 1473
(11th Cir. 1985)).
104. Front pay refers to an award of wages to an employee who has not yet been reinstated.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 267-68 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stock-
ade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, 559 F.2d 310 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
105. For a discussion of front pay, see Note, Front Pay-Prophylactic Relief Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 VAND. L. REv. 211 (1976).
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is denied or inappropriate. 106 Front pay compensates the plaintiff for
economic losses between the date of the court decree and the date the
plaintiff obtains her rightful place in the work force.10 7 The use of front
pay especially is appropriate in cases in which the court orders place-
ment to the next available position rather than immediate reinstate-
ment.108 The availability of front pay offers an alternative to immediate
displacement of an incumbent employee.
V. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act'09 (NLRA) to
ensure the rights of workers to join unions and engage in collective bar-
gaining."10 Congress established the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to administer the NLRA."' The creation of the Board concen-
trated primary decision making power over the rights of workers in a
single agency, and limited the federal courts to review of the Agency's
decisions. The NLRA authorized the Board to issue cease and desist
orders whenever the Board found unfair labor practices." 2 The Board
also may award affirmative relief to victims of unfair labor practices." '
Congress specifically patterned the relief provision of Title VII after the
106. See Shore, 777 F.2d at 1158.
107. See Note, s'upra note 105, at 212.
108. The amount of front pay thus depends on how long it takes the employee to assume her
rightful place. See Shore, 777 F.2d at 1159; see also Thompson, 678 F.2d at 293.
109. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The present NLRA is actually three separate statutes:
the Wagner Act of 1935 (officially titled the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449),
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 (the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136),
and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 (the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub.
L. No. 86-247, 73 Stat. 519 (1959)). Because the Taft-Hartley Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act
were enacted as amendments to the Wagner Act, it is proper to refer to the single, combined law as
the National Labor Relations Act.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) states:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substan-
tial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstruc-
tions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-or-
ganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of nego-
tiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id.
111. For the historical background and significance of the creation of the NLRB, see F. Mc-
CULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 11-14, 23-25 (1974).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). The elements and definition of an unfair labor practice have
been the source of extensive litigation and are beyond the scope of this Note. See id. § 158; see,
e.g., Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981); International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1960), afl'd, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
113. Section 10(c) of the NLRA authorizes "affirmative action including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay" upon a finding of an unfair labor practice by the NLRB. 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
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remedial provision of the NLRA. 114 The discussion below focuses on the
Board's authority to award relief, especially as this authority relates to
the reinstatement rights of workers under the NLRA. The goal of this
discussion is to aid in the development of standards for an order of
reinstatement in Title VII cases.
A. Remedies Under the NLRA
Section 10(a) of the NLRAI1 5 authorizes the Board to prevent the
commission of unfair labor practices by fashioning appropriate relief for
victims of violations of the statute."' The Supreme Court recognizes
that the NLRB has broad discretion, comparable to the district court's
power under Title VII,"17 in awarding relief.118 This discretion, however,
is limited by the language of the statute that directs the Board to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act." 9 The Board's power to prescribe reme-
dies also is limited in that the relief should attempt to restore the
situation that would exist but for the illegal discrimination. 20 Remedial
orders that do not further these two goals and that have no relationship
to the injury suffered will not be enforced by the reviewing court.
Courts will uphold an order of reinstatement under the NLRA if
the relief will further the goals of the Act.'2' Reinstatement becomes an
114. See 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hubert Humphrey); id. at 7214 (inter-
pretative memorandum of Title VII submitted by Sens. Joseph Clark and Clifford Case). The Su-
preme Court expressly recognized the origin of Title VII's relief provision in Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 & n.11 (1975). See also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 226-29
(1982).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). Section 10(a) of the Act states that the "Board is empowered
. . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this
title) affecting commerce." Id. See generally San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S.
26 (1957) (affirming that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes when business
affects interstate commerce).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) provides:
[T]he Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such
person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and
to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay,
as will effectuate the policies of [the Act].
Id.
117. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Note that in cases involving relief decrees
ordered under the NLRA, courts conduct judicial review of agency action. Title VII remedies are
determined by the federal district court hearing the case.
118. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215-17 (1964); NLRB v. P.
Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 513 (1942). See generally J. HUNSICKER, J. KANE & P. WALTHER, NLRB
REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 6-9 (rev. ed. 1986) [hereinafter NLRB REMEDIES].
119. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); see Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540
(1943); Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 280 v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 904, 911-12 (9th Cir. 1979); see also
NLRB REMEDIES, supra note 118, at 6.
120. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
121. As in Title VII cases, discussions of reinstatement in NLRA cases include cases involv-
ing instatement of employees not hired because of unfair labor practices.
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issue in NLRA cases in two situations: (1) upon a discriminatory dis-
charge, layoff, or refusal to hire;'22 or (2) upon the offer of a striking
employee to return to work.12 3 Reinstatement rights in each situation
are slightly different. Part B will discuss reinstatement as a remedy in
the case of a discriminatorily discharged employee. Part C will examine
the reinstatement rights of striking employees.
B. Reinstatement for Victims of Discrimination
Reinstatement is the preferred remedy for a victim of discrimina-
tion under the NLRA.124 The unlawfully discharged employee has an
essentially automatic right to immediate reinstatement.'2 5 The em-
ployer must offer the employee the opportunity to return to the posi-
tion that the employee would have held absent the unfair labor
practice. 2 6 If the position is not available, the employer must offer the
employee a substantially similar position. 127 The employer also must
leave open the offer of reinstatement for a reasonable amount of time in
order to fulfill his obligation to the employee. 2 '
The right of a victim of unfair labor practices to reinstatement is
not absolute. Denial of reinstatement is appropriate, however, only in a
narrow set of circumstances: (1) when the discharge was for cause, (2)
when the employee rejects the employer's unconditional offer of rein-
statement, and (3) when changed circumstances make reinstatement an
improper remedy.129 The Board has no power to order the reinstate-
ment of an employee discharged because of misconduct. 30 The Board
122. See, e.g., NLRB v. Apico Inns 512 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Waumbec Mills,
Inc., 114 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1940).
123. See, e.g., NLRB v. Consolidated Dress Carriers, 693 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1982); Carpenter
Sprinkler Corp. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979).
124. An important issue in NLRA cases is the identity of the discriminator: the employer,
the union, or both. This Note focuses only on situations in which the employer committed the
unfair labor practice because those instances seem to have the most direct application to Title VII.
125. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967) (stating that "unless
the employer who refuses to reinstate strikers can show that his action was due to 'legitimate and
substantial business justifications' he is guilty of an unfair labor practice" (quoting NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967))); Southern Tours, Inc. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir.
1968) (stating that the NLRB "can and normally does require reinstatement with backpay").
126. See NLRB v. Fotochrome, Inc., 343 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 833
(1965); Staffman's Org. Comm. v. United Steel Workers of Am., 399 F. Supp. 102, 105 (W.D. Mich.
1975).
127. See, e.g., NLRB v. Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc., 567 F.2d 529, 530 (1st Cir. 1977);
Staffman's Org. Comm., 399 F. Supp. at 105.
128. See NLRB v. Murray Products, Inc., 584 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1978).
129. See NLRB REMEDIES, supra note 118, at 117.
130. See NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). An employer
can discharge an employee as long as the discharge does not involve unfair labor practices as de-
fined in the NLRA. See NLRB v. Condensor Corp. of Am., 128 F.2d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 1942). Simi-
larly, an employee discharged for misconduct does not state a claim under Title VII. See
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also has no authority to order an employer to make repeated offers of
reinstatement. Once an employer makes an offer of reinstatement and
holds the position open for a reasonable amount of time, the Board can-
not force the employer to make another offer if the employee refuses
the original offer."' 1
The most flexible situation in which courts allow the Board to deny
reinstatement is "changed circumstances." Cases falling under this ex-
ception generally involve the elimination of the position that the em-
ployee held prior to his discharge. 132 A common theme in these cases is
the argument that the position was eliminated for economic or other
justifiable business reasons, and the burden to prove these reasons rests
with the employer.' 33 The employer's liability for the unfair labor prac-
tice, therefore, usually is limited to backpay for the period from actual
discharge to the time the employee would have lost the position due to
economic reasons.3 The Board, however, has ordered some employers
to offer the employee the next available position. 3 5
C. Reinstatement for Striking Employees
Whether a striking employee has a right to immediate reinstate-
ment depends on the reasons for the strike. An employee striking for
economic reasons generally has a right to immediate reinstatement only
if the position has not been filled in the interim.' Thus, an employer is
not compelled to displace an employee currently holding a job in order
to offer the position to an employee striking for economic conces-
sions.l'3 The Board requires only that the employer place the employee
on a preferential hire list.
While the failure to reinstate a striking employee who is entitled to
the remedy normally would constitute an unfair labor practice under
the NLRA, 38 the employer can justify his failure to reinstate by show-
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973) (stating that "[n]othing in Title VII
compels an employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in . . . unlawful activity against
it").
131. See NLRB v. Winchester Elec., Inc., 295 F.2d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 1961).
132. See Walter S. Johnson Bldg. Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 428, 431 (1974).
133. See NLRB v. Biscayne Television Corp., 289 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1961). The Biscayne
court observed that "discrimination by the Employer does not compel it to make work for these
persons. Such discrimination does not require the Employer to discharge or lay off others to pro-
vide jobs for these discriminatees." Id. at 340.
134. See NLRB v. Corning Glass Works, 293 F.2d 784, 787 (1st Cir. 1961).
135. Waukesha Lime & Stone Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 973, 974 (1964), enforced, 343 F.2d 504 (7th
Cir. 1965).
136. See Biscayne Television, 289 F.2d at 338.
137. See NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
138. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
[Vol. 42:14411460
TITLE VII REMEDIES
ing that a substantially equivalent position does not exist. Newly hired
replacement workers' 3 and changed economic circumstances both suf-
fice as reasons for the absence of equivalent work. The Supreme Court
limited this rule by deciding that economic strikers have a right to re-
turn to work "[i]f and when a job for which the striker is qualified be-
comes available. ' '140 The Court created another limitation on this right
in Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB.' 4' A striking employee who obtains substan-
tially equivalent employment during the strike forfeits the right to full
reinstatement if the employer has obtained a permanent replacement in
the meantime. 4 2
Strikes initiated to protest unfair labor practices, rather than for
purely economic motivations, create different reinstatement rights in
the striking employees. Subject to the same limitations as dis-
criminatees, s these employees are entitled to immediate reinstatement
to their former positions. 144 The hiring of replacement workers does not
limit this reinstatement right. The Board is authorized to require the
firing of replacement workers if necessary to make room for an em-
ployee returning after a strike that protested unfair labor practices. 145
Title VII reinstatement cases most closely resemble NLRB situa-
tions that involve employees striking to protest unfair labor practices or
employees discriminated against due to unfair labor practices. It is diffi-
cult to find an analogy in Title VII cases to economic strikers attempt-
ing to return to work. Under the NLRA, workers have a presumptive
right to return to the position they were denied due to discrimination,
or to the position they held prior to their strike against unfair labor
practices. This right is not affected by the presence of incumbent em-
ployees. The Title VII relief provision was modeled expressly after the
NLRA relief provision. 46 Thus, a strong argument may be made that
139. See MacKay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46. Recently, the Supreme Court further limited
the rights of economic strikers to reinstatement. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent
Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct. 1225 (1989). The Court decided that an employer is not
required to displace junior crossover employees (strikers who returned to work before the conclu-
sion of the strike) to reinstate more senior strikers at the conclusion of the strike. Id. at 1230. The
Court found no reason to distinguish between replacement workers hired during the strike and
employees who abandoned the strike to return to work. Id. at 1233. Trans World was brought
under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). Since the Court relied on RLA case law
in the decision, it is unlikely that the decision will provide precedent in future NLRA cases.
140. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. at 381.
141. 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969).
142. Id. at 1369.
143. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
144. NLRB v. Fotochrome, Inc., 343 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 833
(1965).
145. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1937).
146. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 & n.11 (1975).
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Congress intended the Title VII courts to exercise the well-established
remedies under the NLRA.147 The EEOC takes this position in its Rem-
edies Policy.
VI. GUIDELINES FOR COURTS ORDERING REINSTATEMENT
The Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody4 ' articu-
lated standards for courts to follow when fashioning equitable relief
under Title VII. Literal application of the Moody tenets seems to direct
courts to award immediate reinstatement to a prevailing plaintiff even
if reinstatement means displacing an incumbent employee. In awarding
remedies for violations of Title VII, courts should attempt to further
the dual statutory objectives of making victims of discrimination whole
and deterring discrimination in the workplace. The surest way to make
a victim of discrimination whole is to place her in the position she
would have held absent the unlawful discrimination.149 The EEOC, in
its Remedies Policy, apparently agrees with this argument. The Policy,
though equivocal, instructs its directors to seek immediate placement
for victims of discrimination, even if the reinstatement or instatement
results in the displacement of an incumbent employee.'
The argument that reinstatement is necessary to further the aims
of Title VII rests on the theory that money damages can never substi-
tute for actual placement in a position of employment.' 5' But simply
guaranteeing the prevailing plaintiff the next available position also is
not enough. While waiting for the next opening, the employee loses val-
uable job experience. Additionally, the loss of self-esteem suffered dur-
ing the period of unemployment must be considered.'52  Fair
competition for jobs is essential to the American dream, that persons
may advance as far as their talents and merits will carry them.5 3
Though the psychological benefits of work are intangible, they also are
real and must not be ignored.15 1
Immediate reinstatement also serves the second objective of Title
VII-eradicating discrimination in the workplace. If reinstatement is
denied because of the presence of an incumbent employee, the ability of
courts to structure relief to address the problem of discrimination will
147. See Alvarez & Lipsky, supra note 68, at 206.
148. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
149. See Allen v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ., 685 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1982); see also
Alvarez & Lipsky, supra note 68.
150. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
151. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982) (stating that "the victims of job
discrimination want jobs, not lawsuits").
152. Id. at 230 & nn.12-13.
153. See Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 294 & n.44 (5th Cir. 1969).
154. See Allen, 685 F.2d at 1306.
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be diminished greatly. To shield itself from required reinstatement, the
employer simply will fill the position with another employee. Though
the employer may be liable for money damages, the goal of eliminating
discrimination from the workplace is not furthered.155
Although the legislative history of Title VII does not address the
issue, a comparison with reinstatement under the NLRA provides some
guidance for Title VII reinstatement. Congress expressly modeled the
relief provision of Title VII from the relief provision in the NLRA.151
While NLRB precedent does not bind courts deciding Title VII cases, it
does provide some direction for interpreting Title VII's relief provi-
sion. 1 57 The Supreme Court in Moody obviously consulted NLRB case
law in determining the standards that courts should follow when award-
ing affirmative relief. The Court generally directs both the Board in
NLRB cases 58 and the courts in Title VII cases1 59 to award relief that
will further the general policies of the respective Acts. Both Acts seek
to make whole the victim of discrimination and to deter unlawful em-
ployment practices in the workplace. These similarities suggest that an
examination of NLRB practices will help discern standards for award-
ing or denying reinstatement to victims of discrimination under Title
VII. Discriminatees seeking reinstatement under Title VII when incum-
bent employees hold their positions most closely resemble employees
who are discriminated against because of unfair labor practices or em-
ployees striking against unfair labor practices under the NLRA. The
NLRB gives these employees essentially unrestricted rights to return to
their former positions.
Precedent under the NLRA calls for presumptive entitlement to
immediate reinstatement, even if reinstatement means displacing an in-
cumbent employee. 60 This precedent, coupled with the standards ar-
ticulated by Moody, seems to indicate that only a rare factual situation
will warrant denial of reinstatement to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff.
Case law under Title VII, however, does not support this conclusion.
Courts regularly deny immediate reinstatement to victorious plaintiffs
155. Similarly, immediate reinstatement would discourage cases of retaliatory discharge. The
courts have an interest in having cases of employment discrimination uncovered. If an employer
can discharge an employee for turning in an employer for violations of Title VII and not be re-
quired to reinstate the employee, the employee will have little incentive to complain about the
violations.
156. Moody, 422 U.S. at 419 & n.11.
157. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Part VA.
159. See supra Part IIIA.
160. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1937).
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when the relief would require displacing an incumbent employee. 161
Some courts mitigate the denial of reinstatement by ordering hiring
preference 162 and front pay'"3 to compensate the discriminatee who
must wait for the next opening.
The primary reason for this difference between theory and practice
is the presence of an additional factor in Title VII cases-concern for
the innocent victim.1 64 Courts fashioning Title VII relief attempt to
structure remedies so that the interests of innocent third parties are not
trampled unduly. The Moody standards have not prevented courts from
exercising discretion to award equitable relief. Title VII case law and
legislative history abound with examples of courts refusing to order re-
instatement when reinstatement would affect the interests of innocent
third parties unduly.
Arguments against allowing the presence of an incumbent em-
ployee to affect a court's decision to order immediate reinstatement fal-
ter when the interests of the incumbent are considered. Any rights
given to incumbents in employment contracts result in the same rem-
edy that proponents of immediate reinstatement claim is inadequate:
money damages. Likewise, the adage "people want jobs, not lawsuits"
works equally well for incumbent employees displaced in order to pro-
vide relief for Title VII plaintiffs.16
5
Similarly, the claim that the incumbent employee would not hold
the position if the discrimination had not occurred and, therefore, can-
not have as strong an interest in the job as the victim of discrimination,
does not withstand scrutiny. This argument implies that the incumbent
employee is somehow part of the discrimination against the plaintiff.
The incumbent employee, however, is usually an innocent third party,
hired without knowledge of the unlawful employment practice that cre-
ated the opening. Courts should attempt to protect the interest of this
innocent victim. 66
To determine whether the presumption of entitlement to reinstate-
ment is overcome, courts must look carefully at the facts of each case
and balance the interests of the victim of discrimination against the
interests of the incumbent employee. While this determination must be
made on an individual basis, certain factors provide guidelines for the
161. See, e.g., Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985); Wangsness v.
Watertown School Dist., 541 F. Supp. 332 (D.S.D. 1982).
162. See Garza v. Brownsville Indep. School Dist., 700 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1983).
163. See Shore, 777 F.2d at 1155; Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
164. See supra Part IIIB.
165. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 & n.13 (1982).
166. Of course, a showing that the incumbent employee did have knowledge of the prior
discrimination tips the scales toward allowing displacement.
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court's decision.
The most important factor that courts should consider is whether
the incumbent employee had knowledge or notice of the alleged dis-
crimination. 167 Incumbent employees arguably are innocent bystanders
or unwilling participants in a dispute between the employer and dis-
criminatee. The weight of this argument diminishes significantly if the
incumbent was alerted that a former employee has a discrimination suit
pending against the employer and is seeking reinstatement to the in-
cumbent's position."6 8
A related factor is the incumbent employee's knowledge of the
prior discrimination. Learning about the discrimination at the time the
incumbent accepts the job favors displacing the incumbent to afford re-
lief to the discriminatee. Learning about the discrimination five years
after accepting the position entitles the incumbent employee to a strong
interest in keeping the job. Of course, any indication that the incum-
bent employee and the employer colluded to discriminate against the
Title VII plaintiff eliminates any interest the incumbent employee has
in not being displaced.
The court also should consider the uniqueness of the position in
question. If the Title VII plaintiff cannot find substantially equivalent
employment, immediate reinstatement may be justified. If the job is in-
terchangeable and openings occur on a periodic basis, ordering a hiring
preference may best serve the interests of all parties. Walters v. City of
Atlanta provides an excellent example of this situation. The job at is-
sue, Directorship of the Cyclorama, was unique, and the plaintiff could
not be made whole with any other position. Immediate reinstatement
was the only way to remedy the Title VII violation. 69
A factor that might weigh against immediate reinstatement is the
recourse available to the displaced incumbent employee. The presence
of an employment contract assures the incumbent of a claim for recov-
ery of money damages. In employment at will situations, this alterna-
tive likely is unavailable. The court also should consider the
incumbent's likelihood of receiving substantially equivalent employ-
ment from the current employer or another employer. Walters serves as
an example in which substantially equivalent employment was not pos-
sible, yet the employer had assured the incumbent a transfer to another
job if the court ordered Walters instated to the Directorship. 170 Notice
of the pending lawsuit coupled with the ability to move to another job
167. See Holland v. Dole, 591 F. Supp. 983 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).
168. See Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135, 1149 & n.12 (11th Cir. 1986).
169. See supra Part IVB.
170. Walters, 803 F.2d at 1149.
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certainly influenced the court's decision to displace the incumbent em-
ployee in Walters.
In close cases, courts should examine whether adequate relief is
available to the plaintiff without displacing the incumbent. The availa-
bility of front pay can play a role in this determination. If another posi-
tion likely will open in a reasonable amount of time, hiring preference
coupled with front pay might satisfy all parties. The use of front pay is
less acceptable if another position is unlikely to become available in the
foreseeable future.
One final factor to consider in close cases is whether the dis-
criminatee and employer will be able to work together after the litiga-
tion. Though this Note gives only cursory treatment to the issue of
workplace hostility, the apparent inability of the employer and dis-
criminatee to have an amicable working relationship after the litigation
might justify a court's denial of reinstatement.171 To determine whether
a working relationship is possible, the court must look beyond the an-
tagonism created by the lawsuit.172 The size of the company, the re-
sponsibility of the position, and the likelihood of repercussions caused
by the hostility all are important factors in the decision.
VII. CONCLUSION
Title VII plaintiffs have a presumptive entitlement to immediate
reinstatement similar to that accorded victims of discrimination or
workers who strike against unfair labor practices under the NLRA. In
NLRA cases, the Board will order reinstatement even if an incumbent
employee who now holds the position will be displaced. Title VII courts,
however, have not responded to the presence of an incumbent employee
in the same manner as the NLRB.
An evaluation of whether to award immediate reinstatement to a
victorious Title VII plaintiff should begin with Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody. 1 3 Moody does not limit the broad equitable discretion that is
given to courts by the relief provision of Title VII. This standard con-
templates immediate reinstatement as the best means to effectuate the
make whole and deterrence objectives of the Act, but the presence of an
incumbent employee forces a court to undertake further analysis. Su-
preme Court precedent allows courts to consider the effects of Title VII
relief on innocent third parties.1 4
171. See EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd,
559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
172. See McIntosh v. Jones Truck Lines, 767 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1985).
173. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
174. See supra Part IIIB.
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Though the case law is far from consistent, some general guidelines
emerge. This Note concludes that a victorious Title VII plaintiff is pre-
sumptively entitled to immediate reinstatement, even if that relief re-
quires the court to displace an incumbent employee. The court,
however, does have discretion in ordering this relief. Exercising that
discretion requires the court to balance the interests of the incumbent
employee with those of the Title VII plaintiff. Several factors are espe-
cially important in the balancing process: (1) whether the incumbent
employee had knowledge of the pending discrimination suit and the
possibility of an order reinstating the discriminatee; (2) when the in-
cumbent employee became aware of the pending lawsuit; (3) whether
the position in question is unique; (4) whether the incumbent employee
has the possibility of recovering damages through a lawsuit, obtaining
substantially equivalent employment, or both; (5) whether front pay is
available as a remedy in the jurisdiction; and (6) whether the employer
and discriminatee can maintain an amicable working relationship after
reinstatement. Consideration of these factors should guide a court when
it must determine whether to displace an incumbent employee in order
to provide relief for a victim of discrimination under Title VII.
Larry M. Parsons*
* Special thanks to Professor Robert Belton for his helpful comments and suggestions.
Thanks also to my wife, Angela, for being foolish enough to marry a law student.
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